Simple versus rich language in disclosure games

DOI10.1007/s10058-017-0203-yzbMath1422.91129OpenAlexW2732487997MaRDI QIDQ2318122

Frédéric Koessler, Jeanne Hagenbach

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0203-y

zbMATH Keywords

persuasioninformation disclosureunravellingnaive audiencerich languageuninformed sender

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Naive audience and communication bias
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Language Barriers
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• Communication With Unknown Perspectives
• Cursed Equilibrium
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.

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