Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0824zbMath1168.91335MaRDI QIDQ5954062

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date: 15 October 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/389695f022b0a6b55d840372f9d7dcca8440a82e

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling

Related Items

Persuasion and dynamic communication, Implementation with evidence, EFFECTIVE PERSUASION, When do simple policies win?, Implementation with partial provability, Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization, Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion, Strategic argumentation, Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games, Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests, Argumentation in artificial intelligence, Coordination and learning with a partial language, On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games, Simple versus rich language in disclosure games, Message exchange games in strategic contexts, A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation, How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence, Argumentation in multi-issue debates, Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration exercise, Mechanism design with partial state verifiability, Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types, Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

Cites Work

• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• A Model of Expertise
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?