Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1207822
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1002zbMath0825.90004OpenAlexW1501801080WikidataQ113445431 ScholiaQ113445431MaRDI QIDQ1207822
Publication date: 16 May 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1002
Decision theory (91B06) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) History, political science (91F10)
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