Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication

DOI10.3390/G11020018MaRDI QIDQ2221263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Esra E. Bayindir, Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal, Ismail Saglam, Ayça Özdoğan

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020018

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamestrategic information transmissiontrusttruth-telling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Review text

Summary: This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three cheap talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and determined by the receiver in the third game (the choice game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the excessive trust of the receiver, our results are not distinguished from those in the one-sender model. Regarding the choice game, our logistic regressions on experimental results suggest that the receiver is more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the messages were nonconflicting.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(10)

• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
• Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
• Intention or request: the impact of message structures
• Experiments on communication in games: introduction to the special issue
• The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
• Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
• Delegation based on cheap talk
• Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
• Endogenous threshold selection with two-interval restricted tests

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• Z-Tree

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