Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(83)- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
- A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
- Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
- The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Competitive disclosure of correlated information
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
- Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
- The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
- Should straw polls be banned?
- Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- Sequential cheap talks
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
- Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
- Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Competitive cheap talk
- Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- Self-managing terror: resolving agency problems with diverse teams
- Competition in persuasion: an experiment
- Expert panels with selective investigation
- Cheap talk about the detection probability
- Union leaders as experts: wage bargaining and strikes with union-wide ballot requirements
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Eliciting information from a committee
- Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
- Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
- Cheap talk and editorial control
- Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
- Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
- Signaling games
- Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
- Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
- Feedback control using a strategic sensor
- Pervasive signaling
- Competition in costly talk
- Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Lying for votes
- Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Independent versus collective expertise
- Strategic argumentation
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
- Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
- Competitive capture of public opinion
- Interest group information in elections
- Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders
- Cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer
- Information transmission and countervailing biases in organizations
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Joint production in teams
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Comparative cheap talk
- Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
This page was built for publication: Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5477767)
