How to talk to multiple audiences

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Publication:536082

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.007zbMath1236.91030OpenAlexW2149409067MaRDI QIDQ536082

Maria Goltsman, Gregory Pavlov

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70367


zbMATH Keywords

communicationinformationmechanism designcheap talkmultiple audienceslong cheap talk


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)


Related Items

Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Strategic information transmission networks ⋮ Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests ⋮ Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis ⋮ Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary ⋮ Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions ⋮ Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Vagueness and information-sharing ⋮ Information transmission and voting ⋮ Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: a cheap talk game with multiple audiences ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk



Cites Work

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