Strategic information transmission networks
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Publication:405520
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016zbMath1296.91054OpenAlexW2136459968MaRDI QIDQ405520
Andrea Galeotti, Francesco Squintani, Christian Ghiglino
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/2974/1/dp668.pdf
Related Items (31)
Constrained public goods in weighted networks with heterogeneous agents ⋮ Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information ⋮ Social learning with multiple true states ⋮ Chaos in social learning with multiple true states ⋮ Stable unions ⋮ Spread of (mis)information in social networks ⋮ Network formation when players seek confirmation of information ⋮ Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks ⋮ Communication and influence ⋮ Verifiable communication on networks ⋮ Information acquisition and use by networked players ⋮ False information from near and far ⋮ Network games with incomplete information ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ Information acquisition and welfare in network games ⋮ Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests ⋮ Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games ⋮ Incentives and the structure of communication ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks ⋮ Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk ⋮ Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion ⋮ Diffusion of multiple information: on information resilience and the power of segregation ⋮ Strategic Influence in Social Networks ⋮ Maximizing the influence of the innovative products diffusion considering advertisement and promotion strategies ⋮ Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks ⋮ Coordination with Local Information ⋮ Designing communication hierarchies ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Not all bridges connect: integration in multi-community networks ⋮ Competitive cheap talk
Cites Work
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Communication networks with endogenous link strength
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Core and periphery in networks
- Network formation with heterogeneous players
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- A Model of Expertise
- Strategic Communication Networks
- Strategic Information Transmission
- A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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