Strategic information transmission networks
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Publication:405520
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.016zbMATH Open1296.91054OpenAlexW2136459968MaRDI QIDQ405520FDOQ405520
Authors: Andrea Galeotti, Christian Ghiglino, Francesco Squintani
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/2974/1/dp668.pdf
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Cites Work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- A model of expertise
- Strategic communication networks
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Core and periphery in networks
- A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Network formation with heterogeneous players
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Communication networks with endogenous link strength
Cited In (40)
- Communication and influence
- Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
- Strategic influence in social networks
- Competitive cheap talk
- Centralizing information in networks
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks
- Not all bridges connect: integration in multi-community networks
- Spread of (mis)information in social networks
- Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
- Network games with incomplete information
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
- Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
- Strategic communication networks
- Coordination with local information
- Constrained public goods in weighted networks with heterogeneous agents
- Comments on ``Strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- False information from near and far
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Diffusion of multiple information: on information resilience and the power of segregation
- Social learning with multiple true states
- Information acquisition and welfare in network games
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- Chaos in social learning with multiple true states
- Stable unions
- Maximizing the influence of the innovative products diffusion considering advertisement and promotion strategies
- Network formation when players seek confirmation of information
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games
- Verifiable communication on networks
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks
- Communication and learning
- Information acquisition and use by networked players
- Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
- Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks
- Strategic Information Revelation
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