Communication and influence
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Publication:4586015
DOI10.3982/TE1468zbMATH Open1395.91064MaRDI QIDQ4586015FDOQ4586015
Authors: Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Joan de Martí, Andrea Prat 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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Cited In (25)
- Supporting others and the evolution of influence.
- Network games with incomplete information
- Strategic communication networks
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
- Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity
- Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
- Existence and approximation of continuous Bayesian Nash equilibria in games with continuous type and action spaces
- Information acquisition and welfare in network games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
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- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games
- Verifiable communication on networks
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities
- Information acquisition and use by networked players
- Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks
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