Information transmission and voting

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01191-XMaRDI QIDQ2074046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yingni Guo

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01191-x

zbMATH Keywords

votingcommittee decision makingverifiable disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Incomplete information and communication in voting
• Voting power: an information theory approach
• Voting as Communicating
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4195747
• Voting with public information
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• Information transmission in coalitional voting games
• Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
• An information-theoretic model of voting systems

Cites work

• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• Deliberative voting
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Social choice and strategic decisions. Essay in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks.
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(3)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3453520 (Why is no real title available?)
• Informational correlation and selective disclosure
• Communication compatible voting rules

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