Dynamic strategic information transmission

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.012zbMath1296.91181MaRDI QIDQ402084

Aleh Tsyvinski, Vasiliki Skreta, Mikhail Golosov, Andrea Wilson

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/30282

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; cheap talk; dynamic strategic communication; full information revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B44: Economics of information

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

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