Recommendations
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Strategic transmission of information and short-term commitment
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
- Strategic information exchange
- Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Cites work
- A Theory of Credibility
- A model of expertise
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Communication and learning
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Dynamic sender-receiver games
- Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Long Cheap Talk
- Long persuasion games
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Professional advice
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
Cited in
(37)- Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning
- Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
- Feedback control using a strategic sensor
- Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- Comments on ``Strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Goodwill in communication
- Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems
- A note on the strategic transmission of endogenous information
- A model of gradual information disclosure
- Starting small to communicate
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- Sender-receiver games with cooperation
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism
- Strategic information flow under the influence of industry structure
- Homotopies on preferences under asymmetric information
- Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
- Strategic Information Revelation
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