Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
From MaRDI portal
Publication:960279
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002zbMath1151.91367OpenAlexW1985238910MaRDI QIDQ960279
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
persuasionseparating equilibriumdisclosure of certifiable informationverifiable typespartial provability
2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items
Dynamic strategic information transmission, On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games, Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission, How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence, A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions, Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence, False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad, The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence, Communication with evidence in the lab, Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes, Persuasion with communication costs, Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences, Strategic communication with reporting costs
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