Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.002MaRDI QIDQ960279zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jérôme Mathis

Publication date 16 December 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

persuasionseparating equilibriumdisclosure of certifiable informationpartial provabilityverifiable types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
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Cites work

• Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(19)

• Full revelation under optional verification
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Persuasion with communication costs
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• Strategic communication with reporting costs

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