A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.01.009MaRDI QIDQ2444685zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shintaro Miura

Publication date 10 April 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

binary actions of the receiverfully certifiable stateno full disclosure equilibriumpersuasion gameset of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Long persuasion games
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Cites work

• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
• Long persuasion games
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Strategic argumentation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(6)

• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
• Long persuasion games
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

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