A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2444685
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.009zbMath1296.91056OpenAlexW2016211995MaRDI QIDQ2444685
Publication date: 10 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.009
set of equilibriapersuasion gamebinary actions of the receiverfully certifiable stateno full disclosure equilibrium
Related Items
Cites Work
- Strategic argumentation
- Long persuasion games
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion