Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0344-8zbMath1282.91060OpenAlexW2100951350MaRDI QIDQ1939516

Ádám Galambos, Péter Eső

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0344-8

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissioncheap talkhard evidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ Full revelation under optional verification ⋮ Persuasion with communication costs ⋮ Strategic communication with reporting costs

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