Persuasion with communication costs
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Publication:2516228
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.004zbMath1356.91023OpenAlexW219984193MaRDI QIDQ2516228
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.004
Related Items
Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure, On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals, Bayesian persuasion with costly messages, Persuasion with costly precision, Strategic communication with reporting costs, Computation theory of cellular automata
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