Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
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Publication:2581787
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Cites work
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge
- Can sunspots replace a mediator?
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
- Disclosures and Asset Returns
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226087 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Long Cheap Talk
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Universal Mechanisms
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
Cited in
(31)- Typing correspondence assertions for communication protocols
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Equivalence properties by typing in cryptographic branching protocols
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- Persuasion with communication costs
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Type-Based Verification of Correspondence Assertions for Communication Protocols
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Implementation with partial provability
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
- Implementation with evidence
- Typing Correspondence Assertions for Communication Protocols
- Selling with evidence
- Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
- Long information design
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment
- Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
- Unidirectional incentive compatibility
- Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
- Disclosure-proof correlated equilibria
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
- Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
- Long persuasion games
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