Disclosure-proof correlated equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.08.001MaRDI QIDQ7346014zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Scott Saas

Publication date 10 September 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.08.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Cheap play with no regret
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
• Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience
• Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Implementation via information design in binary-action supermodular games
• Improving Nash by coarse correlation
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Sequential Equilibria
• Structure of equilibria in N-person non-cooperative games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies

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