Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
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Cited in
(22)- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
- Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
- On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium
- Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
- Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information
- Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
- Cheap play with no regret
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Incomplete contract, transaction-specific investment, and bargaining power
- Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- The selection of zero-non-zero patterned cointegrating vectors in error-correction modelling
- Sender-receiver games with cooperation
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
- Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
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