Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information
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Publication:1294107
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0682zbMath0926.91010OpenAlexW2140342036MaRDI QIDQ1294107
Deborah Minehart, Suzanne Scotchmer
Publication date: 11 November 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ac64066a95983b59ce8bbe96af34c9595edc0057
Related Items (3)
Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games ⋮ Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information
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- Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
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