Implementation with evidence
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
- A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
- Bayesian Implementation
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Ex post implementation
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation with Near-Complete Information
- Implementation with partial provability
- Implementation with partial verification
- Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(43)- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Implementation via rights structures
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Experimental design to persuade
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Implementation with partial provability
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Partial credence goods on review platforms
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- Safe implementation
- Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
- Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Bargaining through approval
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
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