Safe implementation
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Cites work
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- Bayesian Implementation
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Constrained implementation
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Implementation with evidence
- Interim rationalizable implementation of functions
- Level-k mechanism design
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
- Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Rationalizable implementation
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Voluntary implementation
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