Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness

DOI10.3982/ECTA14991MaRDI QIDQ5225124zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman

Publication date 19 July 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14991

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentevidencemechanism designrobustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Evidence reading mechanisms

Cited in

(28)

• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility
• Evidence reading mechanisms
• Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Testing under information manipulation
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Direct implementation with evidence
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Partial credence goods on review platforms
• Screening for breakthroughs
• Safe implementation
• Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
• Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
• Persuasion with verifiable information
• Information design in allocation with costly verification
• Certification design with common values
• Project selection with partially verifiable information
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Ex-post individually rational Bayesian persuasion
• The value of commitment in a network evidence game
• Hard evidence and mechanism design

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