Direct implementation with evidence

DOI10.3982/TE5015MaRDI QIDQ6565782zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5015

zbMATH Keywords

full implementationhard evidencemechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Exact implementation
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation with evidence
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Implementation with partial provability
• Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

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