Subgame Perfect Implementation
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Incremental approaches to establishing trust
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
- The optimal design of a market
- Implementation via backward induction
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
- Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
- On run-preventing contract design
- Divide and compromise
- Privacy in implementation
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
- Implementation via rights structures
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
- On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects
- A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution
- Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: comment
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Noncontractible investments and reference points
- Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- Fair share and social efficiency: a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Trade through endogenous intermediaries
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Implementation of voting operators
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Menu mechanisms
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
- Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Random extensive form games
- Picking the winners
- Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations
- Implementation with partial provability
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Implementation with evidence
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Full implementation in backward induction
- Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
- Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
- Implementation theory
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Voluntary implementation
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation
- An optimal investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
- Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Deterrence, backup, or insurance: game-theoretic modeling of ransomware
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
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