Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01240-8MaRDI QIDQ2217364zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date 29 December 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01240-8

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumsocial choice functionrepeated implementationagents' preferencesoverlapping generations of agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Efficient repeated implementation
• Repeated Nash implementation
• Complexity and repeated implementation
• Repeated implementation
• A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players

Cites work

• A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• Efficient repeated implementation
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• One-step-ahead implementation
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• Repeated Nash implementation
• Repeated implementation
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Virtual repeated implementation

Cited in

(1)

• Efficient repeated implementation

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