Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
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Cites work
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- Efficient repeated implementation
- Incentives in Teams
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Repeated Nash implementation
- Repeated implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Virtual repeated implementation
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