Repeated implementation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2459zbMath0915.90005MaRDI QIDQ1277094

John O. Ledyard, Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80328/

zbMATH Keywords

repeated implementation; outcome function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Voluntary implementation, Repeated implementation and complexity considerations, Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents

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