Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
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Publication:754781
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90002-4zbMath0416.90087OpenAlexW2080286264WikidataQ56526024 ScholiaQ56526024MaRDI QIDQ754781
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90002-4
supergamesinfinite repetition of gamesn-person noncooperative games in strategic formovertaking criterionstationary outcomes of Nash equilibriastationary perfect equilibriastrongly forced outcomes
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