Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90056-PzbMath0705.90105MaRDI QIDQ918449

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

correlated \(\alpha \) -coreI-sustainable payoffinertia supergameone-shot gamestrong, perfect equilibrium points

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Switching costs in infinitely repeated games, Switching costs in frequently repeated games., Finite complexity and the folk theorem in repeated games

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Acceptable points in games of perfect information
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria