Finite complexity and the folk theorem in repeated games
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Publication:811424
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90002-3zbMath0734.90129MaRDI QIDQ811424
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90002-3
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Cites Work
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information