Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria

DOI10.2307/1885999zbMATH Open0422.90100OpenAlexW2081651982MaRDI QIDQ3856471FDOQ3856471

Authors: Thomas Marschak, Reinhard Selten 

Publication date: 1978

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1885999

zbMATH Keywords

response functionoligopoly gamesnormal stateinertia supergameinfinitely repeated gameweak convolutionconservative combinationn- person noncooperative gameparaperfect combination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (8)

• The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
• Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation
• Viscous demand.
• Quick responses in duopoly ensure monopoly pricing
• Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
• The strength of a little perfection
• Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games
• Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames

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