Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria

DOI10.2307/1885999MaRDI QIDQ3856471zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Marschak, Reinhard Selten

Publication date 1978

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1885999

zbMATH Keywords

response functionoligopoly gamesnormal stateinertia supergameinfinitely repeated gameweak convolutionconservative combinationn- person noncooperative gameparaperfect combination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited in

(8)

• Viscous demand.
• Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
• Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
• Quick responses in duopoly ensure monopoly pricing
• Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games
• The strength of a little perfection
• The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
• Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation

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