Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90187-0zbMATH Open1375.91021OpenAlexW2060529426MaRDI QIDQ1676609FDOQ1676609

Authors: William G. Stanford 

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90187-0

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion

Cited In (4)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games
• Convergence of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
• Symmetric equilibrium of multi-agent reinforcement learning in repeated prisoner's dilemma

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