Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90187-0MaRDI QIDQ1676609zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William G. Stanford

Publication date 9 November 2017

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90187-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1512640 (Why is no real title available?)
• Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games
• Convergence of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
• Symmetric equilibrium of multi-agent reinforcement learning in repeated prisoner's dilemma

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