Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0zbMath0492.90093OpenAlexW2040342499MaRDI QIDQ1168226

Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0607.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

observation structurecontinuum of playersmultiplicity of Nash equilibriasuper games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (11)

Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players ⋮ Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium ⋮ A new approach to the implementation problem ⋮ The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets. ⋮ Modeling factions for `effects based operations'. II. Behavioral game theory ⋮ Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes ⋮ More on the `anti-folk theorem' ⋮ Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market ⋮ Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
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