Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8zbMath0552.90099OpenAlexW1966920312MaRDI QIDQ801823

Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaextensive gamesenlarged gameinformation patterns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items

Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players ⋮ The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments ⋮ Strategic market games: an introduction. ⋮ Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets. ⋮ Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities ⋮ Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Players' information in extensive games ⋮ Inductive game theory: a basic scenario ⋮ Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments. ⋮ The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results ⋮ More on the `anti-folk theorem' ⋮ Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
• Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium