Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
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Publication:801823
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8zbMATH Open0552.90099OpenAlexW1966920312MaRDI QIDQ801823FDOQ801823
Authors: Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8
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Cites Work
Cited In (18)
- The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
- On expressing maximum information in extensive games
- Inductive game theory: a basic scenario
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
- Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players
- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Players' information in extensive games
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
- Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II
- More on the `anti-folk theorem'
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