scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001
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Publication:5583591
zbMATH Open0189.20204MaRDI QIDQ5583591FDOQ5583591
Authors: Harold W. Kuhn 
Publication date: 1967
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (35)
- Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
- A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
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- Zermelo and the early history of game theory
- A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria
- Existence of equilibria in a decentralized two-level supply chain
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Dynamical conflict models. I. Language of modeling
- Limit of multistage \(n\)-person games
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Distributed games
- Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties
- Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency
- Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information
- Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample
- Deterministic graphical games
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
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- Large nonanonymous repeated games
- Competitive location, production, and market selection
- A mathematical model of optimal tax inspection
- Players' information in extensive games
- Player importance and forward induction
- On randomization in on-line computation.
- The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
- Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
- Fuzzy aspects of the parsimony problem in evolution
- A rough perspective on information in extensive form games
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II
- Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
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