The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
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Cites work
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Cited in
(39)- On the complexity of succinct zero-sum games
- Reasoning about temporal properties of rational play
- Computational complexity in additive hedonic games
- Computational complexity of winning strategies in two-person polynomial games
- The value of large extensive form games
- Team-maxmin equilibria
- The independent choice logic for modelling multiple agents under uncertainty
- Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
- Propositional logic of imperfect information: Foundations and applications
- Successful Nash equilibrium agent for a three-player imperfect-information game
- Computing human-understandable strategies: deducing fundamental rules of poker strategy
- Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
- Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
- Efficient computation of behavior strategies
- Polynomial games and determinacy
- Limited lookahead in imperfect-information games
- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning: a selective overview of theories and algorithms
- Computer science and decision theory
- On the computational consequences of independence in propositional logic
- Simple strategies for large zero-sum games with applications to complexity theory
- Parallel approximation of min-max problems
- A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibria for extensive form games
- A Logic for Reasoning about Rational Agents
- Finding Equilibria in Games of No Chance
- First-order algorithm with \({\mathcal{O}(\ln(1/\epsilon))}\) convergence for \({\epsilon}\)-equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games
- Non-cooperative rational interactive proofs
- Deterministic graphical games revisited
- Complexity limitations on one-turn quantum refereed games
- On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games
- Extension of backward induction for the enumeration of pure Nash equilibria outcomes
- A sequence-form differentiable path-following method to compute Nash equilibria
- Analysis and computation of the outcomes of pure Nash equilibria in two-player extensive-form games
- The complexity of pure maxmin strategies in two-player extensive-form games
- Efficient representations for team and imperfect-recall equilibrium computation
- Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- Good neighbors are hard to find: Computational complexity of network formation
- Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
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