Successful Nash equilibrium agent for a three-player imperfect-information game
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Publication:1651920
DOI10.3390/G9020033zbMATH Open1401.91018arXiv1804.04789OpenAlexW2797291350WikidataQ129710530 ScholiaQ129710530MaRDI QIDQ1651920FDOQ1651920
Authors: Sam Ganzfried, Austin Nowak, Joannier Pinales
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a 3-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.04789
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Noncooperative games (91A10) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
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