scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1329116

Differential games and control (49N70) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24)

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The paper considers games of perfect information and under some special structure show that payoff profiles obtained in Nash equilibria are unique. Let \(N\) be the set of players and for each \(i\in N\) define player \(i\)'s preference vector \(F_i= \{f_i(j)\}\), \(j\in N\), so that the \(n\)-dimensional vector composed from absolute values of \(f_i(j)\), i.e. \(\{|f_i(j)|\}\), \(j\in N\), is a permutation of the integer set \(1,\dots, n\). Interpretation of the \(f_i(j)\)'s is as follows: if \(f_i(j)= k> 0\) then player \(j\) is favourite of player \(i\) of order \(k\); if \(f_i(j)= k< 0\) then player \(j\) is hostile to player \(i\) of order \(k\). \(f_i(i)= 1\) for all \(i\). Each preference vector \(F_i\) is an expression of the relation of player \(i\) to the other players and is regarded as synonymous to the ``type of the player. The main theorem of the paper is as follows: if the players know their own type and the types of all other players, then every game possesses a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in type strategies; and for any two different Nash equilibria in type strategies the payoffs of the players coincide. An example of a three person differential ``lifeline game of pursuit is used to illustrate that the approach may be useful also in differential games with perfect information. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0915.00030].

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