The simple geometry of perfect information games
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Publication:1889754
DOI10.1007/S001820400169zbMATH Open1097.91015OpenAlexW1980264876MaRDI QIDQ1889754FDOQ1889754
Authors: Klaus Ritzberger, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Stefano De Michelis
Publication date: 9 December 2004
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1425/1/es-115.pdf
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