Stable extensive game forms with perfect information

DOI10.1007/BF01769256zbMATH Open0651.90100MaRDI QIDQ1106750FDOQ1106750

Authors: Tatsuro Ichiishi 

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

perfect informationgame in extensive form\(\alpha\)-core\(\beta\)-coregame form with perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (10)

• Core implementation via dynamic game forms
• A local theory of cooperative games
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability
• Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
• COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
• A note of tight extensive game forms
• Strongly consistent game forms
• Rectangularity and tightness: A normal form characterization of perfect information extensive game forms
• Stable cores in information graph games

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