Core implementation via dynamic game forms

DOI10.1007/BF00295860MaRDI QIDQ1823121zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors V. W. Kolpin

Publication date 1989

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumsequential dictatorshipimplementation of social choice correspondences\(\alpha\)-core\(\beta\)- core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
• α-Stable Extensive Game Forms

Cited in

(5)

• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• ``How characteristic are characteristic functions?
• Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games
• Equivalent game forms and coalitional power

This page was built for publication: Core implementation via dynamic game forms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1823121)