Core implementation via dynamic game forms
The author proves a few theorems, concerning implementation of social choice correspondences. A few types of cores of the game (\(\alpha\)-core, \(\beta\)-core, strong equilibrium) and a notion of sequential dictatorship are considered. The theorems establish the conditions for which game implementation of social choice may be realized by the types of cores mentioned above only under the assumption of sequential dictatorship. As analytical tools the author used so-called effectivity functions and introduced new concepts pertaining to their properties.
- Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
- Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
- α-Stable Extensive Game Forms
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