Core implementation via dynamic game forms (Q1823121)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4114340
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| English | Core implementation via dynamic game forms |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4114340 |
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Core implementation via dynamic game forms (English)
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1989
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The author proves a few theorems, concerning implementation of social choice correspondences. A few types of cores of the game (\(\alpha\)-core, \(\beta\)-core, strong equilibrium) and a notion of sequential dictatorship are considered. The theorems establish the conditions for which game implementation of social choice may be realized by the types of cores mentioned above only under the assumption of sequential dictatorship. As analytical tools the author used so-called effectivity functions and introduced new concepts pertaining to their properties.
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implementation of social choice correspondences
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\(\alpha\)-core
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\(\beta\)- core
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strong equilibrium
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sequential dictatorship
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0.8185750246047974
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0.8117973804473877
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0.8051969408988953
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0.8048502802848816
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0.803654134273529
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