A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibria for extensive form games
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Publication:3560092
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Cites work
- Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
- Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
- Efficient computation of behavior strategies
- Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
- Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
Cited in
(7)- Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
- On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games
- Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games
- Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
- On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games
- Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
- A note on bimatrix game maximal Selten subsets
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