A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibria for extensive form games

DOI10.1142/S021919890900242XzbMATH Open1193.91019MaRDI QIDQ3560092FDOQ3560092

Authors: Charles Audet, Slim Belhaiza, Pierre Hansen 

Publication date: 19 May 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
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zbMATH Keywords

enumerationNash equilibriumextensive gamesequence formextreme equilibriumE\(_{\chi }\)MIP algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
• Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
• Efficient computation of behavior strategies
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
• Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
• Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games

Cited In (7)

• Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
• On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games
• Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games
• Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
• On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games
• Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
• A note on bimatrix game maximal Selten subsets

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