A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibria for extensive form games

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Cites work

Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
Efficient computation of behavior strategies
Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form

Cited in

(9)

On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games
A note on bimatrix game maximal Selten subsets
Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games
Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
Extension of backward induction for the enumeration of pure Nash equilibria outcomes
Analysis and computation of the outcomes of pure Nash equilibria in two-player extensive-form games
Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games
Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games

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