Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency
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Publication:700118
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0888zbMath1037.91011MaRDI QIDQ700118
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0888
91A18: Games in extensive form
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