Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0888zbMATH Open1037.91011OpenAlexW2002918695MaRDI QIDQ700118FDOQ700118

Authors: J. Kline 

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0888

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zbMATH Keywords

A-loss recallEx-ante optimalityExtensive gamePerfect recallTime-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• A comment on the absent-minded driver paradox
• On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees
• The absent-minded driver
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the expected value of games with absentmindedness
• Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
• Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
• Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (5)

• Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
• Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems
• Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight

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