Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0888MaRDI QIDQ700118zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Kline

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0888

zbMATH Keywords

A-loss recallEx-ante optimalityExtensive gamePerfect recallTime-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Review text

The paper deals with the problem of the strategies timing in the extensive games. There exist two basic approaches to this phenomenon: the ex-ante optimality view where the player fixes his strategy before the actual play of the game, and the optimal time-consistency view where the player can change his strategy after each of his moves. It is known that both approaches are equivalent for the games with perfect recall and that they lead to different behaviour in some types of the inperfect recall. The main problem solved in the referred paper is the specification of an exact rate between the perfect recall and ``absent-mindedness under which the equivalence between both views vanishes. Such type of recall is formulated as a condition of so called A-loss recall which is still sufficient for the equivalence, and it is necessary for it in the sense that whenever it is violated, there is some pay-off assignment for which the equivalence beaks down. Moreover, the problem of the existence of a time-consistent strategy is considered, and the relation between that existence and the condition of A-loss recall is formulated.

Recommendations

• Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
• Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver ``paradox
• Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems
• Characterizations of perfect recall
• On the expected value of games with absentmindedness

Cites work

• A comment on the absent-minded driver paradox
• Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
• Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
• Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3128727 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302003 (Why is no real title available?)
• On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees
• On the expected value of games with absentmindedness
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The absent-minded driver

Cited in

(7)

• Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems
• Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
• On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees
• Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
• Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight

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