Memory and perfect recall in extensive games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.002zbMath1077.91006OpenAlexW2081328787MaRDI QIDQ1885433

Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (8)

Dynamic interactive epistemology ⋮ Logics of Rational Interaction ⋮ AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Stit semantics for epistemic notions based on information disclosure in interactive settings ⋮ Thompson transformations for IF-logic ⋮ Merging frameworks for interaction ⋮ Temporal Aspects of the Dynamics of Knowledge

Cites Work

• Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency
• Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Recall in extensive form games
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic
• Complete Axiomatizations for Reasoning about Knowledge and Time
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