Characterizations of perfect recall

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0534-xzbMath1398.91060OpenAlexW2408628474MaRDI QIDQ2398185

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Publication date: 15 August 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0534-x

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gameslarge extensive form gamesperfect recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices ⋮ Backward induction in games without perfect recall

Cites Work

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• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
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• Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?

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