Trees and extensive forms
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Publication:960254
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002zbMath1153.91341MaRDI QIDQ960254
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002
91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)
91A43: Games involving graphs
91A18: Games in extensive form
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A35: Decision theory for games
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