Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result
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Publication:513594
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0zbMath1402.91026OpenAlexW2253904855MaRDI QIDQ513594
Klaus Ritzberger, Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Publication date: 7 March 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0
subgame perfectionperfect informationequilibrium existencebackwards inductionlarge extensive form games
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Games in extensive form (91A18)
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Cites Work
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