On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90115-3zbMath0635.90103MaRDI QIDQ1097842

Wolfgang Leininger, Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90115-3

zbMATH Keywords

measurable functions; perfect information; existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies; finitely or countably many players; infinite-action games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A07: Games with infinitely many players

Related Items

DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP, Competition as a Hierarchical Multistage Game, The \textit{non}-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions, Continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration, Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly, Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result, Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria, Markov-perfect equilibria in intergenerational games with consistent preferences, Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games, Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium, Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information, Optimistic stability in games of perfect information, Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities., Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information, Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information, Learning and self-confirming long-run biases, Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?, Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games, THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A generalization of the ``maximum theorem
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A model of economic growth with altruism between generations
• Non-cooperative games
• Differentiable Nash equilibria in altruistic economies
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• The Existence of Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Growth with Altruism between Generations
• Consistent Plans
• Sequential Equilibria
• Survey of Measurable Selection Theorems
• On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept