Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games (Q2641228)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4189500
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    Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4189500

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      Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games (English)
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      1990
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      This paper relates infinite-action (continuous) games of perfect information to finite-action approximations of such games and thereby obtains a new existence proof for subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the finite-action case. Accumulation points of SPE paths of approximating finite-action games are shown to be SPE paths of the limiting infinite- action game. However, no such upper hemi-continuity property holds for SPE strategies. The discontinuity in strategies corresponds to a need for forward induction in the SPE construction for the infinite-action game, thus conflicting with the Harsanyi-Selten principle of subgame consistency.
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      infinite-action continuous games
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      perfect information
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      finite-action approximations
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      subgame-perfect equilibrium
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      subgame consistency
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