Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games (Q1121187)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4102855
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    Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4102855

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      Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games (English)
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      1989
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      The paper deals with perfect equilibria in the n-person infinite multi- stage games. It is shown that an equilibrium can be approximated by a sequence of perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in finite truncated games. Unlike to previous works [see, e.g., \textit{D. Fudenberg} and \textit{D. Levine}, J. Econ. Theory 31, 251-268 (1983; Zbl 0521.90106)], the approximation procedure is related to the study of equilibrium histories rather than equilibrium strategies. The author discusses the advantages and disadvantages of his approach.
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      infinite horizon game
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      perfect equilibria
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      n-person infinite multi-stage games
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      perfect \(\epsilon \) -equilibria
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      finite truncated games
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      approximation procedure
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